NewYorkUniversity
LawReview

Essays

2019

Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice

Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz, Kate Crawford

Law enforcement agencies are increasingly using predictive policing systems to forecast criminal activity and allocate police resources. Yet in numerous jurisdictions, these systems are built on data produced during documented periods of flawed, racially biased, and sometimes unlawful practices and policies (“dirty policing”). These policing practices and policies shape the environment and the methodology by which data is created, which raises the risk of creating inaccurate, skewed, or systemically biased data (“dirty data”). If predictive policing systems are informed by such data, they cannot escape the legacies of the unlawful or biased policing practices that they are built on. Nor do current claims by predictive policing vendors provide sufficient assurances that their systems adequately mitigate or segregate this data.

In our research, we analyze thirteen jurisdictions that have used or developed predictive policing tools while under government commission investigations or federal court monitored settlements, consent decrees, or memoranda of agreement stemming from corrupt, racially biased, or otherwise illegal policing practices. In particular, we examine the link between unlawful and biased police practices and the data available to train or implement these systems. We highlight three case studies: (1) Chicago, an example of where dirty data was ingested directly into the city’s predictive system; (2) New Orleans, an example where the extensive evidence of dirty policing practices and recent litigation suggests an extremely high risk that dirty data was or could be used in predictive policing; and (3) Maricopa County, where despite extensive evidence of dirty policing practices, a lack of public transparency about the details of various predictive policing systems restricts a proper assessment of the risks. The implications of these findings have widespread ramifications for predictive policing writ large. Deploying predictive policing systems in jurisdictions with extensive histories of unlawful police practices presents elevated risks that dirty data will lead to flawed or unlawful predictions, which in turn risk perpetuating additional harm via feedback loops throughout the criminal justice system. The use of predictive policing must be treated with high levels of caution and mechanisms for the public to know, assess, and reject such systems are imperative.

2018

Hiding the Ball

Pierre Schlag

Lawyers, judges, law teachers, and law students are forever telling each other what the law is. Whether they are issuing briefs, opinions, or law review articles, they are forever staking out legal positions. And when they stake out these legal positions, they are always ascribing them to some ostensibly authoritative legal source. Hence, it is that legal actors and legal thinkers say things like, “The Constitution requires… ,” “The doctrine of worthier title provides … ,” “The parol evidence rule states that… ,” “18 U.S.C. 1503 prohibits … .” And so on.

The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path of the Law

David Luban

This Essay explores the connections between Justice Holmes’s ideas about law practice and his jurisprudence. What we discover, or so I will argue, is an unfamiliar Holmes–a Holmes whose arguments differ in important respects from the standard positivist and realist ideas that later generations read back into The Path of the Law. I want to suggest that reading Path as proto-Hart, proto-Frank, or proto-Cohen distorts a good deal of what Holmes actually says. In my view, Holmes’s penchant for radical rhetoric leads him to overstate the conclusions that he actually means to establish and lands him in fallacies that I explore in some detail. Holmes had a more moralistic picture of lawyers and clients than his own tough talk suggests, and I will suggest that this accounts for the fallacies. In short, reading Path as an implicit definition of the good lawyer helps us distinguish the sound from the specious in the essay’s jurisprudence.

Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law To Make Social Change

Thomas B. Stoddard

“When and how, if ever, can the law change a society for the better? Are there more successful and less successful ways to make social change? Is the law an effective tool for social change? (Or should I have become a social worker instead of a lawyer?) Are there any lessons to be learned from the attempt by so many lawyers of my own generation to make social and cultural change through the formal rulemaking mechanisms of the law?”

This Essay is Professor Stoddard’s last work, which he was writing at the time he became ill. The Essay addresses the themes that ran through Professor Stoddard’s entire career as a public interest lawyer, focusing specifically on the ways in which litigation can make social change, and its limitations in that regard.

Lawyering for Social Justice

Nan D. Hunter

Not many of us are pioneers, but Tom Stoddard was. He fought for equality for lesbian and gay Americans before it was respectable; he was proudly out as a gay man before it was professionally safe to be out; and he taught one of the first courses centering on the rights of lesbians and gay men in any American law school. He lived to see the lesbian and gay civil rights struggle take its place with others as a campaign for human dignity and justice. Tom’s final Essay, Bleeding Heart Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, is a reflection on the relationship between litigation, legislation, and the possibilities for law to operate as “culture-shifting” rather than merely “rule-shifting.” I argue that the litigation-legislative dynamic is more structurally complicated than the description in Bleeding Heart suggests, and highly contingent on the historical moment. I comment on what I think is one of the most significant aspects of the Bleeding Heart argument: the implicit assumption that lesbian and gay rights advocates have the potential to regularly win in the legislative arena. Lastly, I offer some thoughts on how one can more consciously seek a culture-shifting practice of law.

Borders (En)Gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm

Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol

This Essay, developed in a prologue and three parts, adopts Latinas'/os' world traveling as a metaphor for Latina/o multidimensionality and as a springboard for LatCrit theorizing. The Prologue is a brief diary entry of un fin de semana viajando mundos–a weekend of actual traveling between New York and Miami; law and familia; profesora and learner; colleague and hija; espanol and English; norte y sur; normativa and other; indigenous and alien. This abbreviated record of a Latina's life reveals, exposes, and unveils Latinas'/os' daily crossdressing simply by virtue of their latinidad. The Essay explores two sets of relationships vis-a-vis their significance to and impact on the development of LatCrit theory.

A Twentieth Amendment Parable

John Copeland Nagle

Once upon a time, there was a constitutional amendment that had avoided all of the disputes characteristic of constitutional law. The Supreme Court had never even mentioned it. Only four district court decisions had in any sense turned on the Amendment’s meaning. Law schools did not hold symposia exploring the subtleties of the Amendment. The definitive law review article on the Amendment had yet to be written. The most attention the Amendment received was as an example of a constitutional provision so straightforward that it generated few of the interpretive controversies that lurked elsewhere in the Constitution.

“Hey! There’s Ladies Here!!”

Sarah Berger, Angela Olivia Burton, Peggy Cooper Davis, Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, Robert Levy

Many have wondered in print about the characteristics and experiences of the women who now seem destined to assume a proportionate share of lawyering responsibilities. How have they experienced law school and legal practice? Have they been welcomed or abused? Have they enjoyed or endured the rigors of qualification for the bar and the challenges of practice? How, if at all, have women affected law schools and legal practice? Do large numbers of women in the profession bring different sensibilities? Differently developed strengths? Different approaches to legal work? If women express dissatisfaction with law school, is it because they are unsuited or ill-prepared for it? Or are they simply more likely to question shortcomings of legal education that inhibit learning for all students?

Realism About Federalism

Frank B. Cross

In this Essay, Professor Cross responds to recent academic efforts to develop a robust judicial federalism doctrine, which advocate increased judicial review of legislative activities and suggest that an expanded federalism doctrine would have significant, negative consequences. Professor Cross challenges the assumption that courts would apply a principled, neutral doctrine of federalism, using empirical evidence to demonstrate that courts consistently have invoked federalism for political or ideological reasons. He suggests that the flexibility of the proposed federalism doctrines would allow judges to manipulate results to achieve ideological ends and that the resulting intrusive judicial review would implicate separation of powers concerns and impair legislative functioning. He argues further that institutional realities-the susceptibility of judges to the concerns and influence of the other branches of government-would prevent such federalism from being a meaningful restriction on the powers of the federal government in any event. Professor Cross concludes that proponents of expanded federalism should focus their efforts on creating a practicable doctrine that is not as vulnerable to ready manipulation and high systemic costs.

Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation

James E. Ryan

In this Essay, Professor Ryan uses a recent decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court, Sheff v. O’Neill, to explore both the limits and the possibilities of school finance litigation, and to begin an examination of the relationship between school finance and desegregation. Using Sheff as his starting point, Professor Ryan contends that school “finance” litigation need not, and perhaps should not, be solely about money. He suggests that Sheff and the experience of the Hartford schools provide strong evidence of the limited efficacy of increased expenditures in racially and socioeconomically isolated schools. Professor Ryan then explains how the underlying right recognized in school finance cases–the right to an adequate or equal education–can support alternative claims for relief. Specifically, he suggests that these rights can support such nonmonetary remedies as racial and socioeconomic integration and school choice.